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~~TOP SECRET~~SUMMARY OF PROPOSED ACTIONS

The following proposed action projects have been derived from the analysis presented in Parts Two and Three of the study. It is recognized that in many cases planning and other appropriate actions already are under way looking toward solution of many of the problems which the study describes, so no further comment in these areas is needed. This study is not directive in nature, and the projects which are described in the following paragraphs will need to be authenticated by appropriate directives or requests for action from the Director of Central Intelligence directly to the responsible organization or agency. The order in which the projects are presented is not intended to represent any relative priority among them. The paragraph numbers cited with each project description refer to related portions of the study.

A. A USIB-sponsored working group, with representation across the U.S. intelligence community, should address the problem of drafting a statement of national intelligence objectives and priorities in sufficient detail and comprehensiveness as to provide operating guidance to intelligence program managers and planners. Such a statement would bridge the existing gap between the existing voluminous and highly detailed statements of "requirements" and the highly generalized, very terse DCID 1/3, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives", and DCID 1/2, "Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives". The statement of national intelligence objectives and priorities would complement the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS) as an aid to intelligence resource management. (Paragraphs 25, 85-97 refer)

B. The DCI and the directors of major intelligence programs should foster development of improved methodologies for the establishment of relative priorities among intelligence activities, particularly in the collection field. Such methodologies should on the one hand improve the means by which U.S. intelligence justifies its requirements for resources and for technical systems in particular, and, on the other hand, also should make it possible to identify those efforts which are of lesser importance or of such relatively low productivity or potential that they should be given particular attention in the event that further reductions in intelligence budgets are directed by higher authority. Examination of the experimental efforts already launched in this field by a number of intelligence organizations should provide a starting point. (Paragraphs 142, 145-153 refer)

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b. The USIB should establish a special study group to prepare recommendations for a more systematic means of interface between policy guidance and intelligence programming, and for developing and strengthening procedures for matching collection and production programs as closely as possible to the identified information needs of key end users of intelligence. As a starting point, each USIB participant, each USIB committee and the Director of National Estimates should be requested to report on what his organization currently is doing or plans to do to assess the match-up between identified customer needs and available intelligence products. On the basis of these inputs, the study group should then prepare for USIB consideration its recommendations as to any requirement for an expanded customer-need survey and proposals for the conduct of such a survey. (Paragraphs 83, 123-125, 130 and 144 refer)

d. A USIB-sponsored task group, including representation from the USIB participants and the USIB committees involved with technical intelligence, should develop proposals for improving coordination of research and development on intelligence collection and processing systems. The proposals should apply both to in-house and to contractual R&D efforts. Attention should be directed to ways and means of identifying problem areas for new research and development, eliminating unwarranted redundancy, and insuring that development of R&D proposals reflect the requirements of all interested agencies. (Paragraphs 31-33, 99-101, and 117-119 refer)

^{NIRB}
e. The ~~DCI~~ should sponsor a comprehensive analysis of the expected role of HUMINT in the coming decade. The analysis should examine the resource implications, and the anticipated relative roles of overt, overt sensitive and clandestine operations in various problem areas and regions of the world. Topics for examination should include the extent to which Department of State reporting might be utilized in lieu of activities financed by intelligence agencies, and the interrelationships of CIA and the military departments in the HUMINT field. (Paragraphs 30, 34, 37, 40-49, 52, 53, 59, 63, 64, 67 and 68 refer)

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~~F~~ G. The NIRB should analyze the present pattern of U. S. intelligence resource allocation to problems in the Free World in the light of present trends in and official statements dealing with U. S. foreign policy, particularly President Nixon's "New Strategy for Peace" policy statement of 18 February 1970. The resource expenditures as displayed in the CIRIS should provide a starting point and the study should examine whether there is basis for recommending changes in emphasis or areas of focus. (Paragraph 24 refers)

~~G~~ H. The NIRB should explore the feasibility of "modeling" future overseas deployments of U.S. intelligence elements to assess whether models of alternative dispositions and resource allocations could facilitate the tasks of program planners and managers. The purpose of such models would be to provide better displays than are now available for the examination of options. The models should reflect assumed political developments and policy decisions which could force close-out or reduction of overt U. S. intelligence activities in various areas of the world. Costs would be depicted in terms of varying levels of financial outlays, personnel availability and associated intelligence risks. (Paragraphs 26, 38, 59 and 133 refer)

~~H~~ I. The NIRB, or an organization under its aegis, should assemble an intelligence systems capability inventory, listing in a uniform format to the extent possible the performance specifications, costs, primary and secondary targets, processing relationships, and performance records of sensor-type collection systems in all intelligence programs. Such an inventory would be intended to complement the CIRIS data in the conduct of program reviews and in the consideration of trade-offs between systems and among resource programs. (Paragraphs 98 and 140 refer)

~~I~~ J. The NIRB should assess the current adequacy of the exploitation of unclassified materials by the various elements of U. S. intelligence, determine the extent to which intelligence resources are now being applied to the problem, and recommend any corrective actions which the evaluation indicates would be appropriate. (Paragraphs 112, 113 and 122 refer)

~~J~~ K. The Department of Defense should be requested to prepare a study of the overall intelligence resource implications of the various contingency plans drawn up by the Unified and Specified and Component Commands in response to directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Without such an evaluation, there is the risk that changes in intelligence resource application or deletion of particular capabilities because of intelligence resource limitations could be accomplished without full recognition of the impact such would have on the contingency utilization of U. S. intelligence resources. (Paragraphs 70-78 refer)